

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026  
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UNCLAS STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

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SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT LEWIS FRONT PAGE BY-LINER NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 7, HEADED "SADAT VOWS TO DEAL WITH ISRAELIS ALONE IF OTHER ARABS BALK."

2. CAIRO, DEC. 6--PRESIDENT ANWAR EL-SADAT SAID TODAY THAT HE WOULD CARRY PEACE NEGOTIATIONS "THROUGH TO THE END" WITH ISRAEL ALONE IF OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES INVOLVED IN THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT REFUSED TO TAKE PART IN THE LATER STAGES ENVISIONED FOR A CONFERENCE IN GENEVA.

3. ACCUSING THE SOVIET UNION OF USING THE PALESTINIANS AND SYRIANS AS "AGENTS" TO OBSTRUCT A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT, MR. SADAT SAID IN AN INTERVIEW WITH THE NEW YORK UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

TIMES THAT HE HAD ANOTHER "SURPRISE," TO BE ANNOUNCED TOMORROW AFTERNOON, THAT WOULD "TEACH THE SOVIETS A LESSON."

4. MR. SADAT SAID THAT BREAKING RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW WAS NOT WHAT HE HAD IN MIND, THOUGH SUCH A STEP MIGHT

BECOME NECESSARY IN THE FUTURE. HE DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT HE PLANNED TO DO, SAYING MERELY THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED IT THIS MORNING WITH VICE PRESIDENT HOSNI MUBARAK AND PRIME

MINISTER MAMDOUH SALEM.

5. BUT PRESIDENT SADAT SAID THAT HE HAD ALREADY SUMMONED HIS AMBASSADOR FROM MOSCOW, RAISING A POSSIBILITY THAT HE MIGHT BE CONTEMPLATING SOME EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET PERSONNEL FROM EGYPT. DURING THE INTERVIEW, MR. SADAT COMPLAINED ABOUT SOVIET "AGENTS" WORKING AGAINST EGYPT INSIDE THE COUNTRY AS WELL AS ABROAD.

6. HE BLAMED MOSCOW FOR WHAT HE CALLED THE "IMPERTINENCE" OF OTHER ARAB STATES THAT HAVE DENOUNCED HIS PEACE INITIATIVE AND CENSURED HIM.

7. MR. SADAT AGAIN REJECTED THE HARD-LINE ARAB CHARGES THAT HE WAS SEEKING A SEPARATE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI TREATY. BUT HE DID NOT MAKE CLEAR HOW HE THOUGHT HE MIGHT GET TO "THE END" OF THE ROAD TO PEACE. HIS REPEATED REFERENCES TO EARLIER TIMES WHEN HE WAS THE BUTT OF ARAB CRITICISM FOR BOLD STEPS THAT OTHER ARABS LATER FOLLOWED SEEMED TO REFLECT A CONFIDENCE THAT CRITICS WOULD EVENTUALLY JOIN HIM.

8. HIS ADAMANT INSISTENCE ON GOING AHEAD AND HIS EQUALLY UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

STRONG ASSERTION THAT HE FELT RESPONSIBLE FOR "THE ARAB NATION" IMPLIED THAT HE WAS CONSCIOUS OF THE PROBLEM HE HAD POSED FOR ARAB LEADERS WHO REJECT HIS EFFORT FOR A NEGOTIATING INITIATIVE BUT SAY THEY WISH FOR PEACE.

9. WITHOUT ANY DIRECT THREAT OF A SEPARATE PEACE, BUT ALSO WITHOUT THE SLIGHTEST SIGN OF SUBMITTING, HE SEEMED TO BE TELLING HIS ALLIES IN EFFECT, "PUT UP OR SHUT UP," WITH A BASIC ASSURANCE THAT IN THE END THEY WOULD FEEL OBLIGED TO GO ALONG.

10. LATE LAST NIGHT, EGYPT BROKE RELATIONS WITH SYRIA, ALGERIA, LIBYA, SOUTHERN YEMEN AND IRAQ AFTER THEY HAD DECLARED THAT THEY WERE "FREEZING RELATIONS" WITH EGYPT IN RETRIBUTION FOR HIS HAVING BEGUN TALKS WITH ISRAEL.

11. "ASSAD MUST HAVE BEEN VERY SHOCKED," MR. SADAT SAID WITH OBVIOUS SATISFACTION REFERRING TO PRESIDENT HAFEZ-AL ASSAD OF SYRIA. "HE WAS THINKING OF FREEZING, BUT I SAID NO, BREAKING."

12. MR. SADAT SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHAT "FREEZING" WAS SUPPOSED TO MEAN, BUT IN ANOTHER REFERENCE TO THE ACTION OF THE ARABS, HE SAID: "I WANT TO TELL MY COLLEAGUES THAT WE ARE CIVILIZED, WE SHOULDN'T FOLLOW THE OLD SYSTEM OF ABUSE."

13. HE CALLED THE BREAK "PROVISIONAL" AND SAID HE WAS WILLING TO RESTORE RELATIONS "WHenever THEY ARE POLITE."

14. EVEN WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, SYRIA WOULD STILL BE WELCOME TO ATTEND THE CAIRO CONFERENCE IF IT CHOOSES, THE PRESIDENT SAID. "WE WOULD RECEIVE THEM BUT NOT GREET THEM OFFICIALLY. THESE ARE MY ORDERS TO MY FOREIGN MINISTER."

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

15. STILL, HE WAS VISIBLY OFFENDED BY THE ACTION OF THE HARD-LINE ARABS AT THEIR CONFERENCE IN TRIPOLI. MR. SADAT'S ANNOYANCE AND DISTRUST OF THE RUSSIANS CAME THROUGH EVEN MORE INTENSELY THAN IN EARLIER STATEMENTS.

16. HE SAID IT WAS THE RUSSIANS AND THE SYRIANS WHO HAD INFLUENCED THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION TO ATTACK HIM.

17. "THE RUSSIANS NEVER PLAYED A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE," HE SAID, "THEY DIDN'T WANT US TO MAKE ANY SETTLEMENT IN THIS PART OF THE WORLD AND THEY DON'T WANT THIS PROBLEM TO BE SETTLED NOW."

18. AMONG SEVERAL EXAMPLES OF WHAT HE CALLED SOVIET "HYPOCRISY," MR. SADAT SAID THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LEBANON HAD GIVEN YASIR ARAFAT, THE PALESTINIAN LEADER, A FORGED AND COMPLETELY FALSE COPY OF EGYPT'S SECRET AGREEMENTS INVOLVED IN THE SECOND SINAI DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT TWO YEARS AGO IN AN ATTEMPT TO PREVENT HIS SIGNING THEM THE FOLLOWING DAY. BUT HE SIGNED.

19. "THEY DO NOT INFLUENCE ME, THEY CANNOT IMPEDE ME," MR. SADAT SAID, REFERRING BOTH TO HIS FUTURE DETERMINATION TO REACH PEACE AND HIS PAST MOVES.

20. HE WAS ONLY A LITTLE MORE SPECIFIC THAN BEFORE ON WHAT HE EXPECTED FROM THE CAIRO CONFERENCE, SCHEDULED TO START DEC. 14 OR 15, BUT THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SEEMED INCREASINGLY FIRM AND COMMITTED TO HIS DECISION TO MOVE AHEAD FOR THE MOST COMPLETE SETTLEMENT THAT IT IS WITHIN HIS POWER TO ACHIEVE.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 05 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

21. HE HAS BEEN BUOYED AND PROFOUNDLY MOVED BY THE ENTHUSIASTIC REACTION TO HIS EFFORTS IN EGYPT, IN ISRAEL AND IN MOST OF THE WORLD, AND HIS POSITION APPEARS TO BE EVOLVING TOWARD EVER GREATER RESOLVE DES-

PITE THE ATTACKS FROM FELLOW ARABS.

22. SO FAR, HE SAID WITHOUT ANY SHOW OF IMPATIENCE, PRIME MINISTER MENAHEM BEGIN HAS NOT REPLIED TO HIS INITIATIVE. BUT WHEN ASKED WHAT HE EXPECTED IN TERMS OF AN ISRAELI PROPOSAL, HE SAID REPEATEDLY, "WE WILL HAVE TO WAIT FOR THE CONFERENCE."

23. THE QUESTION OF SECURITY, HE SAID, "WILL BE ON THE TABLE," BUT HE DECLINED TO GIVE ANY FURTHER EXPLANATION OF WHAT HE HAD IN MIND.

24. BUT HE ALSO SAID MORE THAN ONCE THAT THE DOCUMENTS HE EXPECTED THE CAIRO MEETING TO PREPARE SHOULD BE "THE HEADLINES" FOR THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS "SO THAT WE CAN GET ON THERE TO DRAW UP A DRAFT, A DRAFT PEACE TREATY."

25. PREVIOUSLY, PRESIDENT SADAT HAD SAID THAT HE WOULD TAKE WHATEVER AGREEMENT HE COULD REACH WITH ISRAEL TO "AN ARAB SUMMIT" MEETING BEFORE FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. TODAY, IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHAT HE WOULD DO IF THE OTHER ARABS REFUSED TO PARTICIPATE, HE SAID AGAIN AND AGAIN THAT HE WOULD "GO TO THE END" WITH THE ISRAELIS IF NECESSARY, ALTHOUGH HE MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE EXPECTED THE UNITED STATES TO PLAY A KEY ROLE EVEN IF OTHER ARABS AND THE RUSSIANS STAYED AWAY.

26. MR. SADAT SAID HE WOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK A "COMPREHENSIVE" SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL ON THE "TWO BASIC PRINCIPLES ADOPTED AT RABAT (THE SITE OF AN ARAB SUMMIT MEETING IN 1974)--RETURN OF TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 06 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

AND PALESTINIAN RIGHTS."

27. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT HE OBVIOUSLY COULD NOT NEGOTIATE OVER THE GOLAN HEIGHTS FOR SYRIA, OR THE WEST BANK OF THE JORDAN FOR "THE PALESTINIANS WHO ARE SUPPOSED TO HAVE A HOMELAND," OR THE JORDANIAN OR LEBANESE BORDERS, BUT COULD ONLY DEAL WITH THE SPECIFICS OF EGYPT'S BORDERS WITH ISRAEL.

28. IF HE REACHED AN OVERALL AGREEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLES, HE SAID, AND THE OTHERS REFUSED, "THEY WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES, FACE THEIR OWN PEOPLE."

29. "IF THEY REFUSE TO DISCUSS WITH ISRAEL AND TAKE

THE LAND, THEY WILL HAVE TO FACE THE WHOLE WORLD," HE SAID.

30. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE A VERY

IMPORTANT ROLE, HE SAID, "BECAUSE I CAN'T DO EVERY-  
THING IN 30 HOURS, 30 YEARS OF WAR IN 30 HOURS. WE  
WILL NEED A FRIEND TO BRIDGE THE GAP WITH ISRAEL."

31. PRESSED, HE EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS THINKING OF  
UNITED STATES SECURITY GUARANTEES BETWEEN OPPOSING  
FORCES. BUT THAT ALSO WAS PUT IN THE CATEGORY OF A  
"DETAIL" THAT HE COULD ONLY NEGOTIATE ON EGYPT'S  
BEHALF, NOT FOR THE ARABS AS A WHOLE.

32. ASKED IF HE EXPECTED THE UNITED STATES TO PUT  
PRESSURE ON ISRAEL TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, OR THOUGHT HIS  
OWN INITIATIVE HAD GENERATED ENOUGH MOMENTUM IN ISRAEL  
TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS FORWARD. MR. SADAT SPOKE WARMLY OF  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 07 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

HIS SURPRISE AND DELIGHT AT HIS WARM RECEPTION IN  
ISRAEL, AND HE AVOIDED ANY CALL FOR SPECIAL AMERICAN  
EXERTIONS ON THE ARABS' BEHALF.

33. INSTEAD, HE SAID HE LOOKED TO THE UNITED STATES TO  
"BE EVENHANDED," AND TO REMEMBER THAT WHEN THE PROBLEM  
OF SECURITY WAS CONSIDERED, "OUR SECURITY IS INVOLVED  
AS WELL AS ISRAEL'S."

34. AT THIS POINT, HE SAID IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION,  
HE HAD POLITICAL GUARANTEES IN MIND. "EVENHANDEDNESS  
SHOULD ALSO REFER TO ARMS DELIVERIES, BUT I WILL NOT  
TAKE UP THE QUESTION OF ARMS UNTIL A LATER STAGE."

35. THOUGH HE HAS BEEN RECEIVING A CONSTANT STREAM OF  
VISITORS AND HAS BEEN UNDER VEHEMENT ATTACK FROM ARABS,  
MR. SADAT LOOKED RELAXED AND ELATED, SMILING BROADLY  
WHEN HE TOLD OF THE EMOTIONAL SUPPORT HE HAD RECEIVED  
FOR HIS PEACE EFFORTS FROM PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD,  
RAISING HIS VOICE IN TENSION ONLY WHEN HE TALKED ABOUT  
THE RUSSIANS.

36. HE RECEIVED THE CAIRO BUREAU CHIEF OF THE NEW YORK  
TIMES, CHRISTOPHER S. WREN, AND THIS CORRESPONDENT AT  
HIS PALATIAL OFFICIAL RESIDENCE IN THE CAPITAL, SITTING  
IN A GILT TAPESTRIED CHAIR AND WAVING HIS GUESTS TO A  
COMFORTABLE NEARBY SOFA.

37. HE GAVE THE IMPRESSION OF A MAN WHO HAD SET HIS  
GOAL WITH CONFIDENCE AND CONVICTION AND WAS PREPARED TO  
NAVIGATE HIS WAY TO IT AS EVENTS AND CLIMATE PERMIT,

TRUSTING TO INSTINCT TO GUIDE HIS RESPONSES TO UNFORE-  
SEEN OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES.

38. MR. SADAT SAID HE HAD TOLD NO ONE OF JUST WHAT HE

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 08 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

PLANNED TO DO TOMORROW TO "PUNISH" THE SOVIET UNION.  
"I AM NOT ACCUSTOMED TO TELLING ANYONE MY DECISIONS," HE  
SAID. "WITH SURPRISE, I GET MAXIMUM IMPACT."

39. BUT THE PURPOSE, HE SAID, WAS TO LET THE RUSSIANS  
"KNOW THEY SHOULD EVALUATE THE SIZE AND INFLUENCE OF  
EGYPT CORRECTLY. THEY SHOULDN'T PLOT IN THE ARAB WORLD  
WITH THEIR AGENTS, AND IN THE INTERIOR (OF EGYPT) ALSO."

40. HE SAID THE RUSSIANS COULD STILL ATTEND THE CAIRO  
CONFERENCE IF THEY WANTED TO CHANGE THEIR MINDS.

41. "IF THEY DON'T TAKE PART, THEY WON'T SHARE IN  
WHATEVER RESULTS HERE." HE SAID HE RESENTED MOSCOW'S  
ASSERTION THAT IT WAS NOT UP TO HIM TO ISSUE INVITA-  
TIONS BUT ONLY TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET  
UNION, AS THE CO-SPONSORS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE THAT  
CONVENED FOUR YEARS AGO.

42. "THIS IS CAIRO, MY HOME," HE SAID. "HOW CAN THEY  
SAY I CAN'T INVITE?"

43. BUT HE DID NOT INDICATE HOW IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE  
TO PURSUE HIS POLICY "OF CARRYING GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS TO  
THE END" IF THE RUSSIAN CO-SPONSORS, AS WELL AS OTHER  
ARAB PARTICIPANTS REFUSED TO TURN UP.

44. IT DID NOT SEEM TO BOTHER HIM, AND HE SAID THAT  
HE WOULD WAIT UNTIL SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R. VANCE  
AND UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE PHILIP HABIB, NOW CON-  
DUCTING TALKS IN MOSCOW, CAME TO SEE HIM SATURDAY  
TO ASK THEM ABOUT THE SOVIET POSITION.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 09 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

45. IN ANY CASE, ASKED DIRECTLY WHETHER HE WAS CON-  
TEMPLATING A BREAK IN RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW, HE SAID:  
"I AM NOT AIMING AT THAT NOW, BUT IT MAY BECOME  
NECESSARY."

46. THE PRESIDENT'S WORDS FOR THE UNITED STATES  
AND FOR PRESIDENT CARTER PERSONALLY WERE AMIABLE,  
IN CONTRAST WITH HIS SHARP WORDS FOR MOSCOW. HE  
SAID HE WAS BOTH "GRATEFUL" AND "SATISFIED" BY THE  
AMERICAN ROLE SO FAR, THAT ALTHOUGH HE HAD NOT  
INFORMED MR. CARTER OF HIS DECISION TO GO TO ISRAEL  
AHEAD OF TIME, HE HAD KEPT IN "VERY CLOSE CONTACT

WITH HIM, BEFORE AND AFTERWARD."

47. HE SAID PRESIDENT CARTER HAD SENT HIM "A VERY WARM LETTER, VERY WARM, AFTER THE TRIP" AND HE SAID MR. CARTER WAS "HONEST AND TRUE TO HIMSELF: HE HAS NEVER GONE BACK ON HIS WORD."

48. MR. SADAT ALSO SPOKE WARMLY OF SAUDI ARABIA AND SAID RELATIONS REMAINED ONES OF "FRIENDSHIP AND BROTHERHOOD."

49. "THEY DIDN'T KNOW ABOUT MY DECISION (TO FLY TO ISRAEL) AND WE DIFFERED ON THAT, BUT IT WAS A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION," HE CONTINUED. "ASSAD TRIED TO GET THEM TO CONVINCE ME NOT TO GO AND I SAID IT WAS MY SACRED MISSION. IT IS THEIR RIGHT TO DIFFER."

50. "THERE HAS NEVER BEEN ANYTHING ELSE THAN THAT," MR. SADAT SAID IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION OF WHETHER HE THOUGHT THERE WAS A RISK OF LOSING VITAL FINANCIAL AID FROM SAUDI ARABIA IN RETALIATION FOR HIS POLICY.

51. HOWEVER, HE REACTED INDIGNANTLY TO A THREAT OF UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 10 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

SANCTIONS RAISED BY THE ARAB COUNTRIES THAT ATTENDED THE TRIPOLI CONFERENCE. CALLING IT MERELY "BLACK PROPAGANDA TO DECEIVE THE ARAB PEOPLE," MR. SADAT SAID: "OUR DIGNITY AND OUR DECISION WILL NOT BE BOUGHT BY ALL THE GOLD IN THE WORLD."

52. EGYPT, HE CONTINUED, "HAS HISTORIC RESPONSIBILITIES, NOT TO THE BAATH PARTY (OF SYRIA) OR ASSAD, BUT TO THE WHOLE ARAB NATION. I SHALL NOT LET THEM DOWN AT ALL, EVEN IF THEY CONTINUE THIS LINE."

53. HIS FACE TIGHTENING AND HIS WORDS TUMBLING OUT FASTER AND FASTER, MR. SADAT SAID THE ARAB LEADERS WHO CRITICIZED HIM "ARE IMPOTENT; THEY CAN'T MOVE."

54. "THEY CAN'T HAVE THE COURAGE TO TAKE A DECISION, HE WENT ON. "THEIR ONLY CALCULATION IS TO STAY IN POWER AND TO HOLD DOWN THEIR PEOPLE THROUGH CONCENTRATION CAMPS. THEY DON'T DENY THAT. WE ARE CIVILIZED. WE ARE A DEMOCRACY. I CLOSED THE CONCENTRATION CAMPS SIX YEARS AGO AND I WILL NEVER OPEN THEM AGAIN, WHATEVER COMES."

55. MR. SADAT SAID HE HAD CHALLENGED THE HARD-LINE ARAB LEADERS TO DO WHAT HE HAD DONE IN CAIRO--PRESUMABLY MEANING TO RIDE IN AN OPEN CAR BEFORE MILLIONS OF PEOPLE AFTER HIS TRIP TO ISRAEL. "THEY WOULDN'T STAY ONE HOUR

IN THEIR CHAIR," HE ADDED.

56. MR. SADAT SAT BACK AGAIN AND SMILED. HE GAVE EVERY  
SIGN OF FEELING PERFECTLY AT EASE, CONTENTED THAT HE WAS  
DOING WHAT HIS PEOPLE REALLY WANTED AND WHAT HE FELT WAS  
RIGHT. END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER  
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 11 STATE 292318 TOSEC 120026

UNCLASSIFIED

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